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Abstract New technologies have increasingly featured in en-
vironmental conservation conflicts. We examined the deploy-
ment of imaging devices such as sonar equipment and cam-
eras to survey the Fal estuary in Cornwall, UK. Due to heavy
use of these waters, there have been several disputes coalesc-
ing around protected marine features, including the estuary’s
rare maerl beds. A comparison of two cases, scallop dredging
and docks development, showed technical instruments being
deployed to produce information about the marine environ-
ment as evidence to inform decision-making. The use of im-
aging devices stimulated political action and was regarded as a
move away from emotion-based decision-making towards de-
sired objectivity. Simultaneously, however, the process of
deploying these devices was challenged and there was recog-
nition that the resultant information could be used to construct
the estuary as a politically charged space. Thus, rather than
clarifying and resolving contentious issues, technological in-
terventions generated new baselines for knowledge
contestation and amplified ongoing battles for credibility and
authority.
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Introduction
The complex and inherently social dimensions of environ-
mental conservation are more pronounced in conflict situa-
tions, where fundamental contestation among the agendas
and values of multiple groups of human actors complicates
decision-making processes (Marshall et al. 2007; White et al.
2009; Redpath et al. 2015). At the same time, there have been
continued calls for ‘evidence-based conservation,’ i.e., the
production and analysis of sufficient and robust scientific data
to serve as the core knowledge base informing conservation
policies (Pullin and Knight 2003; Sutherland et al. 2004).
New technologies are increasingly employed to expand this
knowledge base (Arts et al. 2015; August et al. 2015). The use
of such technologically-produced information in conservation
conflicts is located at the complex intersections between the
contested, value-laden claims of competing actors and the
perceived need for evidence in the form of objective, rational,
and politically-neutral scientific knowledge (Ozawa 1996).
This raises questions of how such technologies are being de-
ployed, and what broader implications these sorts of interven-
tions might have for the management of environmental con-
servation conflicts. We address these questions by investigat-
ing the narratives revolving around the production and inter-
pretation of information generated by new technologies in the
case of maerl conservation in the Fal estuary, Cornwall, UK.
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Conceptual Background
Information Technologies and Public Participation
in Environmental Decision-Making
There is a long-standing debate on the capacity of
information-based technologies to enable or hinder public par-
ticipation in environmental decision-making. It has been noted
that the features of these technologies can themselves lead to
particular forms of social organisation (Winner 1986; Beck
1992; Marres 2012), for instance by precluding public partic-
ipation (Fischer 2000). Information technologies have been
shown to reproduce normative inequalities (i.e., the digital
divide), and be susceptible to issues of centralised control,
intrusion into privacy, security risk, and increased surveillance
particularly by state and corporate apparatuses. Apart from
potentially restricting the quality and quantity of public en-
gagement, these potential ambient harms (Jasanoff 2003)
brought about by technocratic solutions (Beck 1992) can also
create a general mistrust in technology.
In less explicit ways, the implementation of these technol-
ogies has been read as ideological and political. For instance,
the use of technologies may be a means of privileging
scientific-rational (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2004; Lidskog
2008), ‘neopositivist’ (Fischer 2000), and technological fix
perspectives (Huesemann and Huesemann 2011), wherein
techno-scientific methods are seen as the only valid modes
of eliciting ‘truth’ or achieving ‘progress.’ Further, the deploy-
ment of these technologies has been understood as justifying
the autonomy of those possessing technocratic expertise and
increasing their influence in decision-making processes
(Nelkin 1975), which have been shown to result in distinctions
between fact and value (Latour 2004), between experience
and emotion (Milton 2002; Fazey et al. 2006), between objec-
tivity and subjectivity (Duckett et al. 2015), between qualita-
tive and quantitative knowledge (Carolan 2006; Adams and
Sandbrook 2013), between scientific and traditional/
indigenous knowledge (Briggs 2005; Watson-Verran and
Turnbull 2005; Nadasdy 2011), and between experts and lay-
persons (Nelkin 1975; Wynne 1996; Fischer 2000). While
these divisions have been critiqued by the authors and others,
they have proven durable as social discourses in shaping and
defining issues.
At the same time, there are more positive aspects to the
relationship between technology and public participation that
hold salient implications for environmental decision-making.
Mistrust in technologies also necessitates new forms of social
organisation, marked by increased public participation and
reflexive modernisation (Beck 1992; Gabe 2004). Thus, some
of the technologies, such as network-based information and
communication platforms that are susceptible to illiberal gov-
ernance and privileged access, can also have the capacity to
heighten awareness and create opportunities for mass
participation (Castells 2010) in environmental decision-
making (Howes 2002; Zavestoski and Shulman 2002), there-
by encouraging ‘environmental citizenship’ (Irwin 1995).
Such participatory technologies may arguably facilitate a
dwindling of the monopoly of technocratic science on ratio-
nality (Hannigan 2006, paraphrasing Beck 1992) since plat-
forms for mass information consumption, dissemination, and
reproduction can be means for the public to engage with the
perspectives of experts. As Yearley (2005: 94) noted, Bthe
complexity and open-endedness of environmental problems
[means] that no single corps of experts [is] likely to be able
to claim exhaustive knowledge of any system large enough to
be of practical significance. For that reason, lay people who
are knowledgeable … of their local environment might be
able to act as additional peer reviewers.^ Recent drives toward
greater expert-public engagement could in turn account for
increased integration of local expertise and alternative sources
of information with scientific knowledge (Peuhkuri 2002), an
increasing hybridity of the identities of actors involved in a
given environmental issue (Castree and Braun 1998), and a
growing degree of ‘scientisation of protest against science,’
where new and reflexive forms of ‘advocacy science’ emerge
to critique traditional and rigid applications of scientific ratio-
nality (Beck 1992; Hannigan 2006).
Complexity, Contestation and Constructionism
Environmental issues and the definition of environmental
‘risks’ (Adam and Loon 2000) have been shown to be more
than just matters of fact, being inextricably bound up with the
social, and concomitantly, multiple and often conflicting
values, agendas and perspectives (Carolan 2006; Marshall
et al. 2007). Ideas of ‘nature’ are constructed and Bfundamen-
tally intertwined with dominant ideas of society […], the pro-
ject of determining what is a natural impact becomes as much
a social and cultural project as it is 'purely' scientific^
(Macnaghten and Urry 1998: 15). Given such enmeshment
of politics and nature conservation (Carolan 2008), and the
observation that conservation is an applied, goal-oriented en-
deavour (Mace 2014) with value-laden visions of what the
nature/society relationship should be rather than is, it has been
suggested that nature conservation may be better
conceptualised as a social zone in which scientific and tech-
nical knowledge serving regulatory decision-making is pro-
duced (Jasanoff 2011), and whereby contested and uncertain
knowledge is a key aspect of the process (Funtowicz and
Ravetz 1993). Viewed in this manner, rather than being the
authoritative or decisive paradigm expected to produce indis-
putable truths, techno-science becomes one of several avail-
able approaches to generate information that may be used to
facilitate better understanding, negotiation, and consensus in
environmental disputes (Ozawa 1996; Oreskes 2004). Any
technologically-derived science-based perspective thus
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simultaneously becomes more necessary but less sufficient for
a definition of truth that is more socially binding (Beck 1992;
Peuhkuri 2002).
Within this context, what becomes helpful is not the pursuit
of ‘optimal’ solutions as such, but rather an understanding of
how problems and solutions come to be defined and are un-
derstood by actors. This requires unfolding the normative con-
texts (Carolan 2008; Juntti et al. 2009) within which nature
conservation practices and knowledge production take place
(Nadasdy 2011). Therefore, rather than weighing up the tech-
nical efficacy of technological interventions, we focus on the
perceptions and social dynamics emerging from discourses
surrounding the techno-scientific production of evidence in
order to better understand the varied uses, socio-political un-
derpinnings, and impacts of new devices featuring in environ-
mental conservation conflicts. Given our interest in under-
standing the relationships coalescing around the deployment
of technologies and in the narratives through which actors
iteratively assign varied meanings to technologically pro-
duced evidence (Hajer 1995; Hannigan 2006), we took a soft
constructionist stance and assessed all narratives in a relativist
manner, as earning Blegitimation and credibility in concrete
contexts and in negotiation with other discourses surrounding
an issue^ (Peuhkuri 2002: 159).
Methodology
The starting point for our research was an exploratory, quali-
tative sociological examination of cases where new technolo-
gies had been employed to mediate human – nature relation-
ships (Verma et al. 2015; Verma et al. 2016). The research site
and the cases we discuss here came to our attention when we
learnt that a diversity of new technologies (including under-
water cameras, sonar equipment, and satellite-enabled de-
vices) were being deployed to map the Fal estuary’s seabed
features in order to inform ongoing environmental conserva-
tion disputes.
Research Site
Falmouth, a town on the Fal estuary, is located in Cornwall, a
rural county in the southwest of England (Fig. 1). The estuary
forms one of the world’s largest natural harbours, which
serves as a port, and has been central to the town’s history
and its economic fortunes. Given the geography of Falmouth
bay and the centrality of the port, there is a plethora of actors
with vested interests in the fate of the waters. While legally, as
with most coastal waters in the United Kingdom, the waters
belong to the Crown, public access rights are enshrined in law.
A large part of the estuary has been classed as a Special
Area of Conservation (SAC) (Fig. 1). This classification
emerged as a result of the 1994 UK Habitats Regulations,
the national enactment of the 1992 EU Habitats Directive. In
part due to the difficulties of imposing environmental direc-
tives on the marine environment, the focus with identifying
SACs was on so-called ‘sub-features’ deemed valuable for
protection. During a consultation process, Natural England
(formerly English Nature), a scientific advisory body to the
government, identified four primary marine features in the Fal
estuary that would qualify the habitat for protected status,
namely sandbanks, shallow bays, inlets, and reefs. Each of
these primary features possesses sub-features of importance:
the sandbanks, for instance, were deemed important because
of the presence of eelgrass and maerl beds.1 This identification
resulted in the designation of the Fal and Helford SAC in
1996. An interviewee from the port authorities explained the
regulatory implications of this designation:
B[The SAC] covers most of our port limits. And what
that designation means is that any development we do,
there’s a strict European planning process that we’ve to
go through. And this is where we’ve ended with projects
costing a lot more money, taking a lot longer in time to
put forward and to achieve when it comes to develop-
ment, predominantly because of that legislation that’s
there protecting the environment.^
While the designation means that the use of the site is
subject to EU law, it is important to note here that the law
distinguishes between ongoing activities and new plans or
projects: the former calls for management to ensure there is
no deterioration of the natural habitat, whereas the latter re-
quires appropriate assessment to be carried out to determine
implications for the site in light of conservation objectives
before any licenses are granted (Solandt et al. 2013).
Disputes within SACs are also subject to two principles fun-
damental to the Habitats Directive: the polluter (or damager)
pays principle and the precautionary principle. The first puts
the burden of proof that proposed activities would not be
damaging on those proposing new developments; the second
puts the onus on establishing that proposed activities would
not have a negative impact on key sub-features (e.g. maerl)
within protected areas. In cases where there is lack of scientific
consensus, the precautionary principle requires parties to err
on the side of preventive caution.
Maerl is a group of seaweeds containing high levels of
calcium and magnesium that give it its crusty, chalky texture
and calcified, coral-like appearance, quite unlike other sea-
weeds. In addition to formation of exoskeletons, maerl grows
in dense interlocking mats across the sea floor, producing
what looks like a coral structure. Maerl is therefore also
known as coralline algae, a form of hard algae (Birkett et al.
1 http://jncc.defra.gov.uk/protectedsites/sacselection/sac.asp?EUCode=
UK0013112
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Fig. 1 Location of Falmouth, Fal Estuary, and maerl and other sub-
features of interest within the Fal Special Area of Conservation (SAC).
The SAC boundary is indicated as dashed orange line, primary maerl bed
locations as pink polygons, and the approximate location of Falmouth’s
port as a red dot (Image source: Cornwall County Council, 2000)
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1998).Maerl requires light for photosynthesis, which limits its
presence to shallow waters of up to 20 m in depth (UK
Biodiversity Action Plan 2008; Hall-Spencer et al. 2010).
While several studies indicate gaps in the present knowledge
of maerl beds, even regarding Bsimple questions such as where
the maerl beds occur^ (Birkett et al. 1998: 10), these studies do
suggest that maerl is patchily distributed (Hall-Spencer et al.
2010). In the UK, it is rare, and the Fal is one of the few places
where extensive live maerl beds are found (SPLASH 2008). It is
also for this reason that maerl is a key sub-feature within sand-
banks that determined the designation of the Fal estuary as an
SAC. Maerl beds are highly biodiverse, serving as a nursery for
economically valuable fisheries species (UKBiodiversity Action
Plan 2008; see also Seasearch 2012 and McCallum et al. 2014).
There are several reasons for the patchy distribution of the algae.
First, maerl requires rather specific environmental conditions to
live and flourish. Second, maerl is slow-growing. Live maerl
grows atop dead maerl at the rate of about one millimetre per
year and is therefore considered a non-renewable resource (UK
Biodiversity Action Plan 2008). Third, due to its free-living and
rootless structure, maerl is sensitive to disturbance. Breakages
within the mat, even of dead maerl, can weaken the larger maerl
bed, making it more prone to erosion (Birkett et al. 1998). The
recovery potential of maerl is therefore classed as poor (Hall-
Spencer et al. 2010).
An important feature of maerl, one that became a point of
contention in the disputes discussed below, is its unique col-
our. Described by our interviewees as being Bvisually stun-
ning^ and resembling Bpurple broccoli sprouting like a carpet
across the seabed^ often extending further than the eye can
see, maerl has a distinct red hue. Dead maerl loses this rich red
hue, gradually losing colour through a range of interim
colourations, finally turning chalky white.
While maerl as a species has limited legal protection in UK, it
is protected as a habitat under the European Commission
Habitats Directive 1992 and the UK Biodiversity Action Plan
(Birkett et al. 1998; Newton 2011). In Cornwall, it is protected
as a key sub-feature of a Special Area of Conservation (SAC), as
identified under the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC). Given that
the implementation and administration of conservation policies
can be especially challenging in marine environments, key sub-
features may become focal points for nature conservation policy.
This means that the condition of the Fal SAC, for example, is
determined in large part by the health and condition of the sub-
feature maerl.
Data Collection
Over the course of 3 weeks in the autumn of 2014, through
snowball sampling we interviewed eight key informants over
the phone. We were interested in individuals who could re-
spond to questions regarding new technological interventions.
However, the (semi-formal) interviews did not focus on the
use of technologies in the first instance. Rather, questions
regarding technologies were posed in relation to interviewee’s
broader understanding of situations (e.g., B…within the con-
text you described what role did sonar imaging play?^). The
interviews each lasted between one and two and a half hours.
All interviews were recorded with the knowledge and consent
of respondents, and were subsequently transcribed and tran-
scripts anonymised. In addition to the transcripts, we also
made extensive use of publicly available archival data – feeds
and documents from social media sites, radio interviews (tran-
scribed), legal documents, technical reports, and press cover-
age. While there were multiple conservation disputes revolv-
ing around maerl as a protected sub-feature, our interviewees
focussed on the most recent conflicts over scallop dredging
and planned docks development, the basis of our two case
studies.
For the purposes of this paper, we labelled each respondent
by their primary self-identification or the capacity in which
they granted interviews to us. Our respondents included a
technical advisor, a port authority staff member, a scientific
campaigner, two fishermen, an advisory group member, and
two representatives from (two different) environmental orga-
nisations. The scientific campaigner, fishermen, and advisory
group member were part of the SAC advisory group, a volun-
tary community forum described to us by an interviewee as Ba
means for anybody with an interest and wishes to have a say
[about decisions pertaining to the Fal SAC to] get some access
to the management forum which is the officially appointed
body … that makes the decisions.^ While there was little
indication of a pro-conservation or pro-development stance
being adopted by the advisory group as such, there were clear
underlying tensions and antagonisms among the ‘developers’
and individuals who opposed them due to nature conservation
and economic reasons. These individuals, including the scien-
tific campaigner and one of the fishermen, were also part of an
independent action group organised to protest against docks
development plans.
We acknowledge here that the roles played by our respon-
dents overlapped, and while dominant roles did exist for most
individuals, understanding their perspectives as attributable to
just one role would be too simplistic. For example, most re-
spondents were local residents who had families with histories
tied to the marine environment and harbour operations. The
fishermen also revealed that they had higher degrees in envi-
ronmental science-related disciplines. We were thus careful
not to overlook the multiplicity of roles and affiliations of
our interviewees in our interviews and analysis.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted by coding data material in
NVivo in tandem with further data collection. This parallel
process allowed us to iteratively elicit and continually refine
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concepts of importance (codes). It also allowed us to build a
rich description of the complex and heterogeneous social, spa-
tial, and technical contexts of the two disputes. Initial codes
were clustered to derive key themes revolving around the
deployment of new technologies for supplying data, informa-
tion, and evidence related to the Fal’s marine environment.
Through this data-driven process, we developed interlinked
themes to organize our findings, including technical aspects
of technology use, social and political aspects of their deploy-
ment, limitations, and contestation over the production of data
and interpretation of evidence produced.
Technological Interventions
Anthropogenic activities have been shown to affect maerl
beds in the Fal estuary directly and indirectly, for instancewith
the extraction of maerl for use as fertiliser in agriculture in the
past (Birkett et al. 1998) and through seabed scouring from
the anchors of ships and buoys (Newton 2011). Here, we
focus on two recent controversies that form our case studies:
the dispute over scallop dredging practices and impacts from
docks development. We first provide the background to both
cases, and then introduce some of the primary technologies
deployed and lay out the technical reasons articulated for such
interventions.
The local commercial fisheries industry is centred in the Fal
estuary itself, and includes crab potting, lobster and prawn
netting, smaller-scale fishing, and a large native oyster farm.
Scallop fishing also occurred, and was carried out in two
ways: collection by hand (commercial scallop diving) and
dredging. Following the designation of the site as an SAC,
contention arose particularly with regard to this latter practice,
which involved towing heavy metal dredges over protected
sub-features of the seabed, including the maerl beds. As a
consequence, a by-law was put in place in 2003 to prevent
scallop dredging in the estuary,2 as the activity was deemed to
be damaging to protected conservation features. The activity
continued, however, as a consequence of legal vagueness as to
whether scallop dredging was an ongoing activity that simply
required management to avoid damage and disturbance, or a
new plan or project requiring appropriate assessments.
Aligned with cultural and economic understandings (i.e., the
view that maerl was an abundant resource prone to coming
loose naturally), the dredging activity was initially considered
as ‘ongoing,’ and presumed to affect mainly maerl that was
already dead (Solandt et al. 2013). These understandings were
disputed by local campaigners and environmental organisa-
tions, which in 2006 started the process of challenging the
scallop fisheries.
Following their initial petition, a voluntary approach was
put in place that allowed scallop dredging for 15 days in each
month of November and December in both 2007 and 2008.
During this time, calls for complete bans continued whilst
assessments were carried out by regulatory bodies. The poten-
tial for damage was confirmed by surveys using visual tech-
nologies,3 namely still/video-cameras that could be dropped
and operated under a boat. While such devices may be con-
sidered as relatively simple compared to other technologies
we would encounter in the docks development case, this
technically-aided information-gathering process was crucial
in the resulting ministerial order banning all dredging in the
Fal in March 2008.4
B… in order to see what the habitats were on the seabed,
the [fisheries management body] got a boat to survey the
seabed and dropped down cameras where they wanted
to dredge … and it showed some of the habitat that
should be protected. So even the [fisheries management
body] couldn’t refute the claim that it was likely to dam-
age the site.… The most important thing was when [the
statutory advisory body] said ‘we can’t say it won’t
damage it,’ which in legalese ways is saying you have
to protect it.^ (Environmental organisation 1 staff)
With regard to the development of the Fal’s docks, the
harbour was administered as a trust port, meaning that it
was managed by a body granted statutory powers by the
government. It was, however, governed based on local
legislation and controlled by a board of commissioners
independent of direction and funding from the govern-
ment. There were no shareholders or owners as such,
and the port was managed for stakeholders (defined as
anyone who used the port), with profits being re-
invested back into the port. At the time of our study, there
were ongoing long-term management plans to widen the
channel to accommodate larger ships, which would re-
quire dredging the approach channel.
While all our interviewees acknowledged a generally high
level of support from local residents for the development
plans, environmental and natural resource management con-
cerns formed the basis for a vocal and active opposition to the
proposed dredging to widen the channel. In addition to the
direct impact on seabed features that would be in the dredge
path, the plans raised concerns from fishermen and environ-
mentalists. They believed that the resultant sedimentation
within the water column over the protracted proposed dredg-
ing period would negatively affect protected features and
2 http://www.uklaws.org/statutory/instruments_32/doc32303.htm
3 http://www.seas-at-risk.org/images/pdf/archive/Fal_and_Helford_synopsis-
1.pdf
4 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/2360/pdfs/uksiem_20082360_en.
pdf
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biodiversity resources within the spoil grounds, i.e., those
parts of the marine environment where the dredge material
would be deposited.
As a proposed plan, environmental assessments were re-
quired as part of the application process. In order to establish
the potential impact on the maerl beds, three interlinked issues
had to be addressed. First, the extent of maerl: howmuch there
was and where exactly it was located. Partly due to the unique
challenges posed by the marine environment, the considerable
spatial scale involved and financial constraints of regular sur-
veying of the estuary, one of our interviewees, a staff member
of an environmental organisation, explained that there had
been no sufficiently extensive or regular mapping of maerl,
although there was a general idea of what was in the estuary
from diver surveys carried out during the identification of the
site as an SAC (pre-designation).
Second, the issue of how to tell whether maerl is dead or
alive centred on two closely related characteristics – mobility
and colour. With regard to mobility, since fragments of maerl
can break off and move to new locations with currents, the
classification of individual branches and the mapping of via-
ble (live) maerl bed boundaries are difficult. This is further
complicated by the fact that colour is used to determine wheth-
er maerl is dead or alive. Maerl’s colour changes gradually -
from red/purple to orange, grey, brown and white - as a branch
dies (see above).
To overcome the issue of scale and to make visible
the otherwise ‘unseeable’ in marine environments, sev-
eral types of technological interventions were deployed.5
Bathymetric sonar was used to produce a 3-D model of
the seabed (to closely approximate depths at different
locations), and side-scan sonar was used to give assess
the structure of the seabed. Drop-cameras were deployed
to ground-truth the sonar-based seabed model and struc-
ture. These cameras were paired with Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) devices and Geographic information sys-
tem (GIS) software, to respectively determine location
coordinates where each image was taken and to spatial-
ly map maerl locations and extent:
BThe difficulty we have is that to see the unseeable, in
other words, what’s down at the bottom of the sea. …
We need technology to be able to see things we can’t do
with our eyes. Now, the simplest solution might be to try
and get a camera in there. Very often it’s a matter of
using remote sensing technology like for instance sonar
in the water or magnetic or electrical methods under-
ground.^ (Technical advisor)
These sets of technological surveying methods provided
the baseline information required for mandatory planning
applications. They were also employed to address a third is-
sue, namely whether relocation of maerl beds would be a
viable strategy, i.e., whether relocated fragments would sur-
vive and develop into thriving beds. Further deployment of
technologies during maerl relocation trials were regarded by
some actors as enabling high-precision sampling:
B[What the technical advisor did] was really valuable [in
selecting sites] for the maerl relocation trials. … What
we did [for the relocation trials was] we used RTK [Real
Time Kinematic]…. Essentially it hooks up with a sat-
ellite so it gets positioning and we ended up with a trial
with accuracy where we knew exactly where we put the
dredger on the seabed… within 2cm, which is incredi-
bly accurate when you think of all the different variables
that are working on you as you’ve got something under-
water.… Lines were straight lines. They weren’t dodgy
lines. … we wouldn’t have been able to do the trial
dredge without those technologies being available.^
(Port authority staff)6
Here, therefore, the technologies were deployed within the
marine environment to visualise and survey otherwise ob-
scured terrain and to provide what was represented as precise
and accurate information in relation to the location, extent, and
condition of a protected sub-feature such as maerl beds. These
heavily technical processes produced data that the port author-
ities submitted to the state regulatory agency as part of the
body of evidence required for approval of a planning
application.
Techno-Political Interventions
In the scallop dredging case, when in 2006 a key player initiated
action in the Fal, there was a sense that the committees and
regulatory bodies in charge of protecting the SAC were refusing
to engage with the concerns of local protestors. In addition to
legal vagueness and cultural perceptions, there was a belief that
those in positions of power to interpret and implement policies
were lacking in political will:
B[The bureaucracy] have a well-worn set of tactics that
they use for avoiding having to deal with people likeme.
They just ignore you or they don’t answer your e-mails,
or they give you the run-around and hope that you just
get bored. You just have to keep on engaging with them
… and frankly embarrassing them and making it impos-
sible for them to hold these flawed positions. … What
5 http://stephburnsfameproject.weebly.com/journal-article.html
6 See also https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/332240/1401-maerltrialreport.pdf
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you are battling is political will. The political will to just
do the right thing isn’t there.^ (Scientific campaigner)
To this end, the scientific campaigner allied with non-
government organisations in efforts to engage the relevant bod-
ies. More than strategic alliances and persistent protest, it quickly
emerged that visual technological interventions were key in pro-
viding effective ‘embarrassment’ that stimulated political action.
Photographs taken of scallop dredgers operating in the area were
submitted as evidence of illegal activity, and these images pro-
voked engagement from relevant bodies that had previously ig-
nored campaigners. Further, our informants believed that knowl-
edge of European legislation coupled with the precautionary
principle and secondary scientific data showing the effects of
scallop dredging on maerl beds impressed upon the regulatory
bodies the severity of protestors’ concerns, and highlighted ur-
gent cause for action:
BIdeally, you would have everything, but what we do
lack is the photos, in most instances. … What [the sci-
entific campaigner] did in order to stimulate this whole
thing was to simply take a photo of a scallop dredger
with a known headland in the background. ... He used a
high-res camera and you could see … the metal ropes
which go down to the dredgers on the seabed. You can
see them restrained so the gear was being towed. So by
taking such very important evidential documentation of
activity, you can’t refute it… The guys were, I think we
call it, bang to rights.…All we had to do is just go into a
room and say [to the regulating bodies], 'here’s a photo
of a boat that is scallop dredging, here’s the scientific
paper from 1996 on the effects of scallop dredging on
maerl'… Put the two and two together with something
called the precautionary principle.….^ (Environmental
organisation 1 staff)
The submission of consolidated complaints prompted a
course of action by regulatory bodies, leading to the banning
of scallop dredging in the Fal. Subsequent studies by the fish-
eries management body confirmed that the practice was likely
to be damaging and resulted in the eventual ban. This outcome
in turn motivated another lobbying attempt by the scientific
campaigner and environmental organisation (alongside a law
firm) in 2012, which led to the government implementing
proactive management measures to safeguard marine SACs
from potentially damaging activities.
Technologically-Produced Evidence as a Counter
to Emotional Arguments
The theme of countering emotive arguments with ‘hard evi-
dence’ (equated with ‘scientific data’) emerged as salient in
our interviews. It was not just actors in support of
development or scientists who believed that such data were
needed. All actors we interviewed emphasised the need for
evidential data. For instance, a senior committee member of
the advisory group generally took a neutral stance in the docks
development debate, but argued that there was marked need
for fewer feelings and more knowledge and data by way of
evidence. Another respondent, a fisherman, emphasised the
need for reasoned, sensible, rational, and objective arguments
rather than emotional (or emotive), liturgical, or extreme
views. However, all of our interviewees articulated that op-
posing actors (and indeed even some allies) were guilty of
emotionality or irrationality. In this sense, environmentalists
were just as likely as fishermen, developers, or scientists to
articulate views implying that other actors appeared lacking in
balance, common sense, reason, and objectivity.
Within the context of such understandings, new technolo-
gies were seen as able to produce ‘hard evidence.’ For some
actors, these devices became the conduit through which the
emotive arguments of others could be countered. When que-
ried about the role of technology for environmental conserva-
tion purposes, one interviewee, who had carried out some of
the technical surveying work with sonar and ground-truthing
methods to determine maerl baselines, stated:
BThe problemwith conservation that I’ve encountered is
that an awful lot of it is driven by well-meaning people,
but based purely on emotive arguments. But to do any-
thing effectively, you really need to base it on data. ... the
difficulty is in understanding exactly what that habitat is,
where it is, and what affects it. ... What tends to happen
is that the debate becomes very emotive, and extreme. ...
the work that I’m doing is attempting to show that actu-
ally a lot of what they’re saying on the emotive side is
wrong. That doesn’t mean to say that we shouldn’t be
doing something about conservation. But what I’m ar-
guing is that we should have a more scientific, data-
driven approach.^ (Technical advisor)
In the case of docks developments, technological data pro-
duction was part of the legal requirements for planning appli-
cations. However, the measures were also clearly carried out
to provide scientific data to address and counter the concerns
of local groups vocally opposed to the dredging for develop-
ment of the docks:
BPeople are very emotional, very emotive about the sea.
… People sort of have a feel, like it’s the common good I
suppose, when it comes to water. So although it’s our
seabed - we own the seabed and we regulate the water
that is above it - we have had a few campaigners in-
volved … just fundamentally opposed to the dredging
happening and it’s been quite a challenge…. We’ve had
to go away and make sure we have the science to be able
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to give to them, so it’s made this project probably one of
the best projects for scientific data. Every question
you’ve got, we’ve got some data about it somewhere.^
(Port authority staff)
‘Not a World of Red and White’
While all actors we spoke to agreed that ‘hard evidence’ was
necessary to manage the Fal and Helford SAC and its
protected sub-features, and some actors viewed new technol-
ogies as a way to produce evidence that would counter the
perceived emotionality and dogmatism presumed to lead to
bad management decisions, there was still no overall consen-
sus of what was ‘scientific’ and constituted valid knowledge.
These disagreements over the production of information and
interpretation of data coalesced around the use of the techno-
logical devices. In terms of the production of knowledge, we
noted above that technological interventions were seen by
some actors as providing precision and accuracy in mapping
the baseline conditions of protected sub-features and of giving
rich insights into otherwise ‘unseeable’ terrain. However,
others highlighted the limitations of these techno-scientific
setups and raised the need for a combination of technologies,
including less technologically-reliant but, in their understand-
ing, more comprehensive methods of acquiring data (for ex-
ample, diver surveys):
BI’m quite prepared to believe that an acoustic technol-
ogy can differentiate maerl from say rock or sand, but
there is no way on earth it can detect the difference
between live maerl and dead maerl and obviously that’s
a really critical issue. So these things are useful but like
every methodology in science they have their limita-
tions.^ (Scientific campaigner)
We noted above most of our interviewees had a back-
ground in a natural science discipline and the consensus across
the range of informants regarding the need for evidence and
data. This, however, did not lead to consensus over what was
‘scientific.’ Rather than opposition between ‘local’ and ‘sci-
entific’ knowledge, or fundamental differences between ‘ex-
pert’ and ‘non-expert’ perspectives, issues arose over who had
the right means to derive evidence. A senior advisory group
member explained that most people on the advisory group
were there as volunteers with day jobs, so did not have the
time and resources needed to form Bdefinitive [and] eviden-
tial-based^ opinions. He contrasted the advisory group to peo-
ple who were being paid to conduct research. There were also
issues in defining who had integrity and therefore objectivity.
For example, a fisherman interviewee questioned the funding
sources of some of the third party groups commissioned to do
research for the developers. Further, there was contestation
over who was sufficiently qualified to produce credible infor-
mation and interpret data reliably.
Much contestation concerned existing interpretations
and representations of technologically-produced data,
for example that the findings emerging from the maerl
relocation trials (using Real Time Kinematic technolo-
gies) could not be extrapolated to the scale of the
planned development dredging:
B… the disturbance they created in the [maerl reloca-
tion] trial is very different to what will happen in the full
scale dredge. So it’s simply impossible to extrapolate
from the trial to the full scale dredge. You know, it’s like
looking at recovery from a paper cut and trying to …
assert that if you can recover from a paper cut in two
weeks, then you’d recover… from open heart surgery in
two weeks.^ (Scientific campaigner)7
In terms of establishing baseline conditions of protected
sub-features in the estuary, the colour of maerl remained a
tricky issue, and limitations were acknowledged. One respon-
dent discussed colour fidelity, which is affected by factors
such as distance from maerl bed and position or angle relative
to the observer, and also the effects of water depth and lighting
conditions on how the colour of the maerl was interpreted. For
instance, in good light, the reddish-purple colour of the maerl
shows well. However, red light is readily absorbed in water,
and the deeper the maerl, the more the colour captured by
images will be distorted, with important consequences for
classification of beds and branches of maerl as dead or alive:
B…the data being presented does not distinguish be-
tween what is clearly a viable maerl bed and … just
fragments washed somewhere else. There’s no distinc-
tion whereas what I’d like to do is actually have three
categorisations – a dead maerl bed, a live maerl bed, and
an area of largely live maerl fragments to actually show
that you get this graduation. It’s not a world of black and
white, or red and white in this case.^ (Technical advisor)
Such ambiguities with regard to the colour, status and via-
bility of maerl, persistent despite technological interventions,
had larger implications for the dispute over the extent and
locations of the protected feature. This contributed partly to
charges of misrepresentation of data, providing ‘misleading
information’ and ‘spinning the science.’
We were given two perfectly opposed sides to the same
issue, both using the same sorts of visual technological sur-
veying techniques and involving the same regulatory body. It
is also interesting to note the different forms of knowing each
7 See also https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/332244/140303-isapreport.pdf
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side relied on. Where the campaigner emphasised his first-
hand experience and scientific knowledge that went alongside
video surveys, the advisor underscored the more technical
aspects of distinguishing and plotting viable maerl colonies:
BWhat happened is that the proponents of the dredging
… basically try to pretend they missed… when they do
the survey of the area, they try to pretend there was
virtually no live maerl there, that there was so little that
it could effectively be ignored. Well, that was complete-
ly untrue. …I actually got hold of their survey reports
and raw data and was able to show that … this was a
misrepresentation. They basically spun their own sci-
ence.… I’ve done a lot of diving in that area and I know,
I’ve seen the sea bed there. I know there’s lots of live
maerl down there. And … I took some video … it
wasn’t formal survey work, but I took some underwater
video and I sent the co-ordinates to the [regulatory body]
and said, ‘… you’re being had here, you’re being
misled’.^ (Scientific campaigner)
B[the port authority] went into a meeting, and [the reg-
ulatory body] were talking about the live maerl bed im-
mediately outside the docks. And [the port authority]
played them one of the videos to show that actually this
alleged live maerl bed was in fact dead. So again, even
[the regulatory body] are being given misleading infor-
mation. … What a lot of previous work used by the
activists [has] done, is they’ve used diver surveys, and
wherever a diver finds a piece of maerl that’s still pink,
they clock that as a live maerl bed, even if it’s washed
off and might be a kilometre away. Technically, it’s not
yet dead, but it’s not a viable piece of maerl. It is going
to die. It’s no longer in a place it can live. So what the
activists have is … a lot of areas plotted as live maerl
which actually, technically, you could argue, it’s not yet
dead but it’s not actually a thriving, viable maerl colo-
ny.^ (Technical advisor)
Discussion and Conclusions
Our research revealed a landscape of considerable complexity,
where technologically-mediated knowledge production and
interpretation were intrinsically bound up with the political,
so that the use of evidence-producing devices was simulta-
neously effectual and problematic in managing the course of
conflicts.
In one sense, visual technological devices played a persua-
sive communicative role in the push for the policy outcome of
banning scallop dredging. These technologies were regarded
by local activists and environmental organisations as having
produced key evidence that stimulated action from what they
felt were non-responsive regulatory bodies. In some instances,
therefore, our findings showed that visual technologies can
have mobilising effects when employed by members of the
public pursuing environmental justice (Cohen and Ottinger
2011), highlighting the strategic potential of technological de-
vices to motivate ‘political will’ and draw wider attention to
otherwise localised environmental conflicts. This potential is
particularly salient given that the technologies we focussed on
in the scallop dredging case (digital still cameras and video
cameras) are not particularly exclusionary in terms of afford-
ability (at least within the context of our research site), and
have indeed become increasingly accessible to the general
public in recent years. However, it is important to underscore
that the use of these devices in our study did not stand alone in
facilitating ‘environmental democracy’ (Jasanoff 1996), but
was part of a multi-pronged approach including in-depth un-
derstanding of legislation, working alliances with established
groups, and reference to recognised scientific data. At a
broader level, this implies the need for members of the public
to be informed of institutional and legal processes in environ-
mental disputes, and to be given open access to scientific data,
or at least to be part of larger networks that provide integral
support in order for their technologically-aided protest actions
to be effectual.
In another sense, it was clear that the technologies were
utilised to provide technical information (e.g., about the base-
line conditions of maerl) that would serve as evidence for
legally-required assessments. Here, therefore, technologies
such as sonar, GPS, and RTK devices were deployed by some
actors to produce precise, accurate, and valuable data under
challenging marine conditions, and were thus an important
means of addressing the ‘evidence trap’ situation documented
by Cook et al. (2013), where lack of evidence of impact is
perceived as evidence that there is no impact.
However, it also emerged that these techno-scientific pro-
cedures were entrenched in the political. Most prominently,
technologies were used by some actors as a means of produc-
ing evidence to counter ‘emotional’ arguments. Interestingly,
in our case studies, the traditional oppositions between scien-
tific and lay knowledge did not occur: All of our interviewees,
independent of their current occupation, highlighted their ed-
ucational backgrounds in natural science disciplines and
aligned on the need for scientific data and evidence. This did
not, however, result in consensus over who or what was ratio-
nal, balanced, and reasonable rather than emotional. This as-
pect of our findings brings to the fore a lesser examined aspect
of environmental conservation conflicts, raising questions of
why emotions are considered a liability when negotiating con-
servation and how the devaluing of emotions is employed as a
strategy in undermining competing claims (Milton 2002).
Relatedly, it became apparent that the debate, while depen-
dent on ‘factual’ rhetoric drawing on scientific and technical
knowledge, simultaneously saw technology and science
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become platforms for opposing claims (Peuhkuri 2002). This
meant that actors recognised that technologically-derived rep-
resentations could serve to provide evidence and to gain cred-
ibility in decision-making processes. Even where new tech-
nologies were generally regarded as a step towards desired
objectivity away from emotion-based decision-making, some
actors simultaneously contested the techno-scientific knowl-
edge production and data interpretation processes. For in-
stance, in the docks development case, in addition to actors
highlighting the limitations of information-producing technol-
ogy such as sonar imaging, contention occurred on grounds of
the integrity and methodological rigour of those using the
devices. Further, some actors articulated concerns that the
new technologies effectively excluded particularly members
of the public who did not possess the resources needed to
produce primary data and lacked the time to analyse the infor-
mation derived from these devices. This also ties in to existing
debates on public participation (or exclusion) from environ-
mental decision-making processes and the role of
technologically-derived knowledge in these situations
(Fischer 2000). More importantly, the issue underlying the
concerns articulated by some of our respondents was that the
use of new devices represented a shift in baselines in the battle
for credibility and authority. These concerns raise further
questions of whether the use of ever-newer instruments are
part of a runaway process in which new techniques simply
generate new points of technical contention, and if this process
serves to reduce or re-establish gaps between ‘expert’ and
‘layperson’ and among different scientific disciplines.
From another perspective, the contests over technologically-
derived information also implied a perception that using these
devices entailed performative aspects, given that actors
recognised that the technologies were not simply apparatuses
to produce knowledge or to persuade, but also means to pro-
duce representations that could be deployed to materially and
discursively construct the estuary as a politically charged space
(Rose-Redwood and Glass 2014). This was exemplified in the
disagreements over the locations of viable maerl beds, related to
conceptual difficulty in defining whether the maerl was alive,
dead, or dying. Underwater footage served as material evidence
that made the maerl visible and tangible, proving or disproving
its presence or absence in particular locations. Even if the inter-
pretation of such footage (i.e., the colour and therefore the con-
dition of the maerl) was contested, being able to produce such
footage allowed actors to support and reiterate their respective
arguments, or at least respond to contradictory arguments on
their own terms. Using technological devices was thus more
than about increasing knowledge: resulting visual images en-
abled actors to articulate their respective arguments in order to
make an impact and take action (Marres 2012). It is also worth
noting here that the maerl was itself resistant to technological
surveillance, and that many of the techno-scientific methods
could not guarantee straightforward and unambiguous visual
representations that would not be open to conflicting interpre-
tations. This draws attention to the role of the maerl beds and
technological devices themselves in defining the conservation
issues and generating public participation in the Fal estuary
(Callon 1986; Marres 2012).
Our findings show that the use of new technological de-
vices in disputed environmental conservation situations can be
both complex and ambiguous. While these instruments can
produce data that may be used to motivate resolutions and to
produce necessary evidence in some environmental conserva-
tion disputes, they may also exacerbate the Bproblematic as-
pects of attempting to employ scientific expertise in areas of
public concern^ (Yearley 1996: 187) or indeed generate new
forms of contestation, e.g., over the interpretation of new vi-
sual information. We therefore suggest that if the shared even-
tual aim of actors is to productively manage environmental
disputes, then Bhigh-quality technical analysis [and] scientific
knowledge has to be produced in tandemwith social legitima-
tion^ yielded from processes of trust-building through
community-based institutions (Jasanoff 1996). This is because
the production of data by ever-newer technologies in isolation
does not appear to address underlying socio-political disagree-
ments. Rather, existing tensions may be intensified by increas-
ingly passionate disputes between different groups of actors
over more and more technical details of conservation-related
measures, thus overlooking the broader contexts and relation-
ships within which the disputes occur.
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